



# HOUTHIS DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN

Houthi-Yemeni Influence Campaign

April 2025

## Introduction

In early April, ClearSky's team discovered a persistent Yemeni/Houthi influence campaign operating in Israel and the Gulf states. We first<sup>1</sup> exposed the campaign in 2019. It continues to operate in a similar manner to what was uncovered in 2019. Between 2019 and 2022, the campaign mainly focused on Gulf countries, particularly **Saudi Arabia and the UAE**, and returned to focus on Israel from late 2024. We did not find any indication that the campaign targeted Israel between 2019–2022.

The campaign operators have invested for years in building and maintaining an infrastructure that includes fake websites, Facebook pages, and social media profiles. The ongoing maintenance of such a campaign indicates its importance and the resources allocated to sustain it. These resources include, among other things, dedicated personnel, funding, and a certain level of proficiency in Hebrew.

The campaign first exposed in 2019 involved the dissemination of false reports by several social media profiles. These reports focused on gossip-related topics (for example, the death of an Israeli actress and singer). They were published on pages of Israeli media outlets and in several marginal Israeli social media groups, mainly on Facebook. The 2019 campaign was based on methodologies used in Iranian influence campaigns that we had uncovered starting in 2018<sup>2</sup>.

This report focuses on the campaign active in recent months, with an emphasis on the personas created to disseminate content, the websites established as part of the infrastructure, and the campaign's messaging.

The report also addresses differences between the 2019 campaign and the content published in the current one.


### The campaign's TTPs include the following stages:

- Infrastructure setup by the campaign operators:
  - Creation of Facebook groups (e.g., "חדשות סלבריטאים", English translation: "Celebrity News").
  - Fake social media profiles, mainly on Facebook (to a lesser extent also on Twitter).
  - The fake profiles join legitimate Israeli Facebook groups.
- Message dissemination method:
  - Gossip news items are copied from legitimate Israeli news sites or from legitimate Facebook posts written by Israeli citizens. These items are copied into the fake news/gossip site created by the campaign operators.
  - The Facebook group created by the campaign operators publishes short posts with a link (clickbait). Clicking the link redirects to the fake website controlled by the operators, where the copied article appears.
  - The fake profiles share the posts containing the links to the fake sites in legitimate Facebook groups.

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<sup>1</sup> [clearskysec.com/yemen-disinformation-campaign/](https://clearskysec.com/yemen-disinformation-campaign/)

<sup>2</sup> [clearskysec.com/2018/11/](https://clearskysec.com/2018/11/)



*Campaign Methodology – Flowchart*

## Key Insights


- An ongoing campaign since 2019, shifting focus over time between Israel and Gulf states.
- Methodology and dissemination techniques have remained unchanged since 2019.
- The content theme remains gossip. In 2019, the campaign spread false news. Currently, it spreads real news copied from legitimate sources.
- Dissemination is done via fake profiles in open Facebook community groups to maximize reach and blend the campaign with local content.
- Many domains used in 2019 are still active.
- No evidence of malicious activity such as watering hole attacks or malware injection on campaign websites.
- Campaign goals remain unclear. It may later be used to spread fear-inducing messages or malicious content. Another possibility is to establish direct contact between Yemeni operators and Israeli users outside the Facebook groups. It is possible that, at certain times, the operators may insert malicious scripts into their websites.
- Websites include content in Hebrew for Israeli users and in Arabic for Gulf audiences. The main site is in Arabic, it has low credibility and does not appear professional or authentically Israeli to local users.

## Research Details

### 1. Fake Websites

The campaign operators created several fake websites that publish gossip content copied from legitimate news outlets and authentic Facebook posts. This section focuses on one example – gool-live[.]com.

**gool-live[.]com** – A website established by the campaign operators, active since 2019. It features content in both Hebrew and Arabic, targeting Israeli audiences and Gulf state audiences respectively. The articles are fully copied from legitimate sources, such as Israeli news sites (e.g., Maariv, ICE) and authentic Facebook posts.



Homepage of gool-live[.]com



gool-live[.]com features Arabic-language articles targeting audiences in the Gulf states

The WHOIS records for the domain show that it was registered under privacy protection. However, between 2019 and 2023, the domain was transferred between several hosting companies based in Yemen:


Email	maxmam8@gmail.com - (tech, admin, registrant)
Name	Yasser Salah - (tech, admin, registrant)
Organization	Maxmam - (tech, admin, registrant)
Street	Taiz street , Alnoor zone - (tech, admin, registrant)
City	Sanaa - (tech, admin, registrant)
State	Sanaa - (tech, admin, registrant)
Postal code	00967 - (tech, admin, registrant)
Country	YEMEN - (tech, admin, registrant)
Phone	967770159458 - (tech, admin, registrant)
Nameservers	ns2gtb.name.com ns4hmp.name.com ns1dns.name.com ns3sxz.name.com

An examination of the email address (*maxmam8@gmail[.]com*) listed in the WHOIS records revealed additional domains registered with the same address, some dating back to 2019. Below is an example domain. A full list of domains associated with this registrant, likely active in the current campaign, is included in the appendix at the end of this report. Some of these domains were previously reported in our 2019 research.

msaderpress.com	maxmam8@gmail.com	2020-02-03	2019-02-02
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
## 2. Fake Facebook Pages

The campaign operators created several fake Facebook pages. These pages serve as the initial distribution point for articles taken from the fake websites. A short sentence from the article is posted along with a link to the fake site (clickbait). This section focuses on one example – the page “Celebrity News”, originally in Hebrew: "חדשות סלבריטאים".



Screenshot from the Fake Page “Celebrity News”

The page, which poses as a Hebrew-language page, responded using the Arabic word "@followers" (from Arabic: متابعين). This indicates that the page operator's Facebook interface is set to Arabic.



Another page with the same name distributes content from good-live[.]com and uses the logo of a legitimate gossip website.




### 3. Fake Personas on Facebook

The campaign operators created dozens of fake Facebook profiles used to distribute articles and links to the fake websites within legitimate Israeli Facebook groups.

There is little evidence of effort in the creation of these profiles. Names are either in Arabic script, Arabic transliterated into English, or generic English names (e.g., Sarah Sarah).


Below is an example of a profile with an Arabic name that has not posted on its own timeline since 2019 but has shared articles with links to a campaign website in legitimate Israeli Facebook groups. Like other profiles, it shares posts from the "Celebrity News" page.

Below is an example of a fake profile with an Arabic name: الفرّح محمد الفرّح





Below is an example of a fake profile with a random English name: Sarah Sarah




#### 4. Joining Legitimate Facebook Groups


The fake profiles join open community Facebook groups such as "באר שבע והסביבה" (English: "Be'er Sheva and Surroundings") or regional buy/sell groups. The group topics appear random, and the selection seems based on group size. Most groups have tens of thousands of members. This indicates that the campaign operators conducted research to identify suitable groups, suggesting some proficiency in Hebrew.

Within these legitimate groups, the fake profiles repost identical messages originally published on the campaign's fake Facebook pages. This method allows the operators to distribute messages efficiently through repetition, without needing to create new content each time, and helps blend the campaign with organic activity.

Below is an example of several groups a fake profile joined:



Here is an example of an article and a link to the fake website being shared in a legitimate Israeli group ("לוח רמת גן-גבעתיים", English: Ramat Gan-Givatayim Community Board).



Here is an example of an article and a link to the fake website being shared in a legitimate Israeli group ("יורם שפטל - ללא מעצורים - הקבוצה", English: "Yoram Sheftel – No Holds Barred – The Group").





Example of several profiles that shared the same article in different groups:



## Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)

Websites used for message distribution:

1.	13june[.]net	24.	live-kora-tv[.]com
2.	andronor[.]com	25.	mah-news[.]com
3.	atherpress[.]com	26.	maxmam[.]com
4.	azal-press[.]net	27.	maxmam[.]net
5.	bashkortostan-export[.]com	28.	msaderpress[.]com
6.	billioclub[.]online	29.	mzagnews[.]com
7.	boktek[.]com	30.	naba24[.]net
8.	brocksales[.]com	31.	newspro5[.]com
9.	buzztrnds[.]com	32.	online-koora[.]com
10.	elnokhbah[.]com	33.	reefy[.]com
11.	fast-news[.]net	34.	sadame[.]net
12.	forteanzoology[.]com	35.	shabwahportal[.]com
13.	foworac[.]xyz	36.	shahd24[.]com
14.	gool-live[.]com	37.	taj-press[.]com
15.	hoursnews[.]net	38.	tawdeeh[.]com
16.	isfahanfootball[.]com	39.	themed-info[.]com
17.	israelpress[.]net	40.	tmasterplan[.]org
18.	koora-live[.]online	41.	txuelectricdelivery[.]com
19.	koora-online[.]live	42.	usoqt[.]com
20.	koora-online-tv[.]com	43.	worapps[.]com
21.	koora-live-tv[.]com	44.	yallashothd[.]com
22.	koralive24[.]com	45.	yallashot-new[.]com
23.	live-kora[.]net	46.	yemenmax[.]net